Natural Science Perspectives in the Psychology of Religion: From Early Biological Interpretations to Contemporary Cognitive, Evolutionary, and Neuroscientific Approaches

Background and Problem. The psychology of religion has traversed a long and non-linear historical path, experiencing an initial flourishing (1880–1920), a subsequent decline, and a significant resurgence since the 1990s. Despite this renewed growth, driven by advances in genetics, neuroscience, and cognitive science, a comprehensive overview of the development of natural science perspective within the field—from their origins to the present—remains lacking. Objective. This article aims to provide a generalized historical and theoretical overview of the development of natural science perspectives in the psychology of religion, tracing their evolution from early biological interpretations to contemporary cognitive, evolutionary, and neuroscientific approaches. Methods. This study is a theoretical and historical review employing narrative synthesis. Key literature was identified through searches in major academic databases (PsycINFO, Scopus, Web of Science) and by tracing references in foundational historical works. Sources were included if they proposed or critically engaged with naturalistic explanations of religious phenomena. The analysis was structured chronologically and thematically, covering the early formative period (late 19th–early 20th century) and the modern period (approximately 1990–present). Results. The analysis reveals two distinct phases. The early phase (1880s–1920s) was characterized by biological interpretations of religion, originating not from experimental psychology but from clinical psychiatry (the French school: Charcot, Janet, Ribot), which demonstrated the organic basis of religious symptoms. The modern phase (since the 1990s) is driven by three pillars: (1) genetics (e.g., research on the heritability of spirituality), (2) neuroscience (including studies of brain correlates and the controversial field of neurotheology), and (3) cognitive and evolutionary science (e.g., theories of religion as a by-product of evolved cognitive mechanisms like HADD and cognitive optimality). A central, unresolved debate concerns whether religion is a direct evolutionary adaptation or an evolutionary by-product. A key limitation of modern cognitive-evolutionary approaches is their ahistorical nature, which risks biological reductionism by neglecting socio-cultural specificity. Conclusion. Natural science perspectives have established religion as a legitimate object of scientific inquiry. However, future progress requires moving beyond reductive models toward integrative approaches that combine biological explanations with cultural-historical frameworks, such as systemic-functional and cultural-historical psychology.

Естественно-научные перспективы в психологии религии: от ранних биологических интерпретаций к современным когнитивным, эволюционным и нейронаучным подходам

А.М. Двойнин

Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики», Москва, Россия

Резюме. Актуальность и проблема исследования. Психология религии прошла нелинейный путь: расцвет (1880–1920), спад и возобновление развития с 1990-х годов. Несмотря на интенсификацию исследований, обусловленную достижениями генетики, нейронауки и когнитивной науки, систематический обзор становления естественнонаучных подходов в психологии религии отсутствует. Цель исследования. Представление обобщенного историко-теоретического анализа естественнонаучных подходов в психологии религии — от ранних биологических интерпретаций до современных когнитивных, эволюционных и нейронаучных концепций. Методы. Теоретико-исторический обзор методом нарративного синтеза. Отбор литературы проведен в базах PsycINFO, Scopus, Web of Science и по библиографическим ссылкам. Включались источники, предлагающие или критикующие натуралистические объяснения религиозных феноменов. Анализ структурирован хронологически и тематически, охватывает ранний (конец XIX – начало XX века) и современный (с 1990 г.) периоды. Результаты. Выделены два этапа. Ранний (1880–1920-е) характеризовался биологическими интерпретациями религии, берущими начало из клинической психиатрии (французская школа: Шарко, Жане, Рибо), представители которой показали органическую основу религиозных симптомов. Современный этап (с 1990-х) базируется на трех направлениях: (1) генетика (исследования наследуемости духовности), (2) нейронаука (изучение мозговых коррелятов, нейротеология), (3) когнитивная и эволюционная наука (теории религии как побочного продукта эволюционно сложившихся когнитивных механизмов: HADD, когнитивный оптимум). Центральная дискуссия — является ли религия прямой эволюционной адаптацией или ее побочным продуктом. Ключевое ограничение современных подходов — внеисторический характер, ведущий к биологическому редукционизму и нивелированию социокультурной специфики. Заключение. Естественнонаучные подходы утвердили религию как легитимный объект научного исследования. Дальнейшее развитие предполагает переход от редукционистских моделей к интегративным подходам, сочетающим биологические объяснения с культурно-историческими рамками (системно-функциональная и культурно-историческая психология).

Ключевые слова: психология религии, естественнонаучные подходы, когнитивное религиоведение, эволюционная психология, биологический редукционизм, культурно-историческая психология, история психологии, нейротеология, биологическая интерпретация

Introduction

The psychology of religion is one of the branches of psychological science that has traversed a very extensive and non-linear historical path. The birth of the psychology of religion virtually coincides with the birth of scientific psychology itself, which in contemporary historiography of science is dated to the last two decades of the 19th century. Researchers associate the emergence of this branch with the works of W. Wundt, W. James, G. S. Hall, and others (Loewenthal, 2008; Nelson, 2008; Wulff, 1997). The flourishing of the psychology of religion occurred between 1890 and 1920, after which this branch experienced a decline in research interest and an actual fall (Beit-Hallahmi, 1974). The revival of the psychology of religion took several decades and proceeded rather unevenly (Wulff, 1998). A serious growth of the branch has been observed since the 1990s in connection with the development of scientific research, the growth of publications, the renewal of activities of professional psychological communities, and the opening of new laboratories and research centers. Overall, throughout its historical development, the psychology of religion has undergone numerous transformations, rejections, and difficulties associated both with the contradictory nature of the phenomena of religion and spirituality themselves and with methodological shortcomings and dead ends in their investigation (Chanda, 2022).

In the last decade, the psychology of religion as a scientific discipline has demonstrated steady growth: new research directions are developing (evolutionary, cognitive, neuroscientific, and others), new facts and theoretical developments are emerging, and the number of publications continues to increase. Despite the fact that the total volume of scientific publications on the psychology of religion is significantly smaller than, say, in cognitive or developmental psychology, the growth rate of publications on the psychology of religion from 2011 to 2020 is twice as high as in the field of cognitive psychology (Volkova, Zuev, Rusalov, 2021).

The development of the modern psychology of religion is conditioned by many reasons, not the least role among which, as it seems to us, is played by the emergence of new methodological approaches based on natural science views on both the nature of religion and the nature of man. The purpose of this article is to provide a generalized picture of the development of natural science views in the psychology of religion from the moment of their more or less distinct manifestation to the present time. We are not attempting to inventory these views or provide an exhaustive overview of them. Our task is much more modest: we will outline the main paths and sources of the development of natural science views in the psychology of religion, while being aware that the outlined picture is, in essence, a sketch, which, without drawing in details, reflects reality somewhat simplistically. Nevertheless, such simplification, as it seems to us, is necessary for understanding the overall, so to speak, composition of the psychology of religion in its natural science “cross-section.”

Method

This study is a theoretical and historical review employing a narrative synthesis methodology. The selection and analysis of literature were guided by the aim to trace the development of natural science perspectives within the psychology of religion from their inception to the present day.

Literature Search Strategy: The sources for this review were identified through a two-pronged approach. First, foundational and historical texts were identified based on authoritative histories of the psychology of religion (e.g., Wulff, 1997; Beit-Hallahmi, 1974) and include original works by early theorists such as W. Wundt, W. James, G. S. Hall, T. Flournoy, and key figures from the French psychiatric school (J.-M. Charcot, P. Janet, T. Ribot, E. Murisier). Second, contemporary sources were identified through systematic searches in major academic databases, including PsycINFO, Scopus, and Web of Science. The search terms used included combinations of: “psychology of religion,” “neurotheology,” “cognitive science of religion,” “evolutionary psychology of religion,” “genetics of religion,” “biology of religious experience,” “neuroscience of religion,” and “history of psychology of religion.” The reference lists of key contemporary monographs and articles (e.g., Boyer, 2001; Kirkpatrick, 2005; Atran, 2002) were also manually searched to ensure comprehensive coverage of the field.

Inclusion Criteria and Analytical Approach: Sources were included if they explicitly proposed, developed, or critically engaged with explanations of religious beliefs, experiences, or behaviors that are grounded in the natural sciences (including biology, genetics, neuroscience, and cognitive/evolutionary science). The analysis proceeded in two main stages corresponding to the historical development of the field. First, the early period (late 19th – early 20th century) was analyzed to identify the foundational naturalistic explanations and methodological debates. Second, the modern period (approximately 1990 to the present) was analyzed by categorizing contributions into three broad thematic streams: (1) genetic approaches, (2) neuroscientific approaches (including neurotheology), and (3) cognitive and evolutionary approaches. For each stream, the core theoretical propositions, key empirical findings, and principal methodological debates were extracted and synthesized. This narrative synthesis forms the basis for the results presented below, with the goal of providing a coherent overview of the development of natural science views in the psychology of religion.

Results

3.1. The Genesis of Natural Science Views in the Psychology of Religion: Biological Interpretations of Religious Phenomena of the Mind

As we have already said, the birth of the psychology of religion virtually coincides with the birth of scientific psychology itself. Since scientific psychology emerged as a separate discipline from philosophy thanks to the introduction of the experimental method and laboratory conditions, it would be logical to assume that the appearance of natural science views in the psychology of religion is somehow connected with this same reason. It would seem that it is precisely the reproducibility of scientific facts under a strictly controlled experimental procedure in laboratory research – one of the key pillars of natural science epistemology. In reality, however, it was by no means these methodological innovations in psychology of the late 19th – early 20th century that led to the emergence of naturalistic conceptions of religious phenomena of the mind.

A good piece of evidence in favor of this thesis is the methodological dualism of the founding father of scientific psychology, W. Wundt, creator of the world’s first psychological laboratory and pioneer in the application of the experimental method, who at the same time contributed to the psychology of religion.

The methodological dualism of the German scientist, as is known to psychologists, was expressed in the division of psychology into two weakly connected spheres, for the study of each of which its own cognitive methodological toolkit was intended. For the study of the simplest reactions and elementary mental structures constituting the content of individual consciousness (sensations, ideas, feelings), the method of introspection and experiment as a way of refining introspective data were intended. This sphere of psychology was called by W. Wundt “Physiological Psychology” (Physiologischen Psychologie). For the study of the general manifestations of mass psychology – the so-called “soul of the people” – fundamentally different methods were intended: historical-ethnological observations and analysis of cultural products – language, myths, religion, traditions, art, etc. Thus, the “Psychology of Peoples” (Völkerpsychologie) was to take shape.

In modern terms, Wundt saw “Physiological Psychology” as a natural science discipline aimed at revealing the laws of nature of the human psyche (Wundt, 1874), whereas he saw the “Psychology of Peoples” rather as a human science aimed at describing the integral psychology of ethno-cultural communities.

At this methodological “fork in the road,” the questions touched upon by the psychology of religion in Wundt’s work followed the path of the “Psychology of Peoples” (See in: Wundt, 1905–1909), which, in essence, distanced them from the natural science trajectory of development. For such a path, it must be admitted, there were quite intelligible reasons. Firstly, these were the objective difficulties of inducing and modeling religious phenomena in laboratory conditions. Secondly, the attitude toward religious phenomena of the psyche as phenomena of the human “spirit” and culture, with still quite limited ideas about the possibilities of psychological experimentation coupled with the imperfection of techniques and apparatus, made them irrelevant for rigorous experimental procedures. The psychology of religion was thereby “farmed out” to historical-cultural, ethnographic descriptions, clinical observations, and nascent survey methods – questionnaires, interviews.

Nevertheless, natural science views in the nascent psychology of religion gradually took shape, but already as consequences of attempts to find naturalistic explanations for religious phenomena of the psyche.

One of the first such attempts, as far as can now be seen, was the psychological analysis of the child’s religious development, carried out in the 1880s by the American psychologist and educator G. S. Hall. Having summarized his own observations of child development and a number of facts obtained by other researchers, the scientist identified stages of the child’s religious development in ontogenesis (Hall, 1882). The theoretical basis of the periodization was the basic biogenetic law, according to which the ontogenesis of an organism is isomorphic to the stages of the phylogenetic development of its species. Asserting that basic religious feelings can be developed in a child in the early months of infancy through careful care of the infant’s body, avoidance of strong stimuli and harshness in treatment, G. S. Hall identified a stage of fetishism in the ontogenetic development of the child, characteristic of preschool age, and a stage of natural idolatry, characteristic of primary school age. In the pubertal period, the child reaches the peak of their religious development (under the influence of religious education) and becomes capable of genuine altruism and love for one’s neighbor (as embedded in the Christian tradition).

However, this theory, although it relied on a certain factual material in the form of observations, was highly speculative and tendentious. At the same time, its scientific significance lay in the attempt to identify the natural prerequisites for the formation of an individual’s religiosity through the analysis of the regularities of their mental development in ontogenesis.

It is important to note that attempts to find naturalistic explanations for religious phenomena of the psyche were carried out by researchers standing on very different methodological positions: from phenomenological to behaviorist.

Thus, a significant role in the formation of natural science views on religious psychological phenomena was played by the ideas of W. James, who is considered a representative of the phenomenological direction in the psychology of religion. W. James rejected the quite widespread idea at the end of the 19th – beginning of the 20th century about the existence of special religious feelings, distinct from all other human emotions. He argued that religious fear, the religious feeling of the sublime, or, for example, love for God, are nothing other than natural human emotions directed toward a religious object (James, 1902).

Within the behaviorist direction, natural science views were expressed in attempts to find an explanation for an individual’s religious behavior from the perspective of the biological advantages it might confer. Religious behavior was seen as conducive to survival and successful adaptation to the environment, and the individual’s religious beliefs as a way of improving biological processes in the organism. For example, W. R. Wells believed that religious beliefs acquire direct significance for the individual’s survival, thanks to their subjective impact on his biological well-being (Wells, 1921). According to D. M. Trout, religious norms and traditions as regulators of behavior contribute to the individual’s successful achievement of those goals that are difficult or impossible to achieve by other means: security, love, food, sex, etc. (Trout, 1932). Later, B. F. Skinner gave a naturalistic explanation of religious behavior as a consequence of operant conditioning (Skinner, 1948, 1971).

The search for explanations for religious phenomena of the psyche, as is known, was also undertaken by psychoanalysts. S. Freud saw in religion a special way, developed by culture, of compensating for man’s helplessness before the forces of nature and the imperfections of culture itself (Freud, 1928). According to C. G. Jung, religious phenomena, from a psychological point of view, are essentially symbolic projections of the psyche, expressing the wholeness of human existence (Jung, 1969). It is noteworthy that attempts to combine Freudianism and Marxism by Soviet researchers in the 1920s-1930s led to even more radical assertions that a person’s turning to religion is one of the ways of sublimating sexual energy through the creation of a system of “social stimuli” that give power to a certain class of society (Reisner, 1925), and that religion itself is a product of childhood unconscious drives of the Oedipus complex (Malis, 1924).

Despite the attempts of the founders and adherents of psychoanalysis to partially naturalize religious phenomena of the psyche, deriving them from the peculiarities of the functioning of the unconscious, psychoanalytic explanations still cannot be classified as natural science views. Even despite S. Freud’s declared position: to avoid all metaphysical and spiritualist speculations and to build psychoanalytic theory on rigorous medical facts. In reality, many theoretical constructions of psychoanalysts, including those concerning questions of the psychology of religion, turned out to be poorly verifiable and essentially metaphysical. Therefore, the further development of psychoanalysis in the context of the psychology of religion in the 20th century proceeded along the path of hermeneutic methodology.

In the emergence of natural science views in the psychology of religion of the late 19th – early 20th century, a significant role, as it seems to us, was played by medical research, represented in the works of psychiatrists and psychopathologists. It was not experiment, but psychiatric observations in the clinic that made it possible to see behind various religious phenomena (demonic possession, clairvoyance, mystical states, etc.) psychic symptoms of natural origin.

In this respect, the “French school” in the psychology of religion advanced quite far – a group of medical researchers of religious pathologies who worked at the end of the 19th – beginning of the 20th century. Thus, J.-M. Charcot came to the conclusion that religious possession is nothing other than a special form of hysteria, and the facts of healing from illness under the influence of patients’ religious faith are explained by autosuggestion (Charcot, 2001). P. Janet, who studied religious ecstatic states, recognized in them symptoms of the so-called “psychasthenia” – a disorder which in modern psychiatry is designated as obsessive-compulsive disorder (Janet, 1926–1928). T. Ribot discovered the dependence of religious feelings on the organic (in particular, constitutional features) of a person (Ribot, 1894, 1898). A pronounced religious passion could pass into pathology of two types: depressive (melancholic), based on feelings of guilt and fear, and exaltative, expressed in a strong feeling of love and enthusiasm. The Swiss E. Murisier noted that pathologies of religious emotions are connected with the disintegration of aspects of religiosity that are inseparable in the normal state – individual and social. With the loss of the social aspect, the believer becomes a mystic, focused on religious experiences. In the case of the loss of the individual aspect of religiosity, a phenomenon such as fanaticism is observed, supported by high identification with the group or community of believers, submission to a leader or creed (Murisier, 1901).

It should be noted that the study of religious phenomena of the psyche by psychiatrists was also actively conducted in Russia during the pre-revolutionary and early post-revolutionary periods. For example, V. M. Bekhterev, M. Yu. Lakhtin, I. A. Sikorsky, A. A. Tokarsky, V. F. Chizh, A. I. Yarotsky and others actively studied, from medical positions, mystical experiences in the mentally ill, phenomena of clairvoyance, religious suggestion, fanaticism, psychic epidemics (demonic possession, demonomania), religious delusion, the influence of spiritualism on the psyche, and many others. In their scientific works, psychiatrists relied on an approach that was called by W. James “medical materialism” (James, 1902), i.e., the identification of physiological explanations for religious phenomena of the psyche (Psychology of Religion in Russia…, 2019).

Apparently, it was precisely psychiatric research that largely influenced the reflection on the cognitive principles of the psychology of religion, which were formulated in a clear form by the Swiss psychologist T. Flournoy. In his work of 1903, he introduced two methodological principles that any psychologist must adhere to when studying religious phenomena (Flournoy, 1903). The first and most famous of them is the principle of the exclusion of transcendence, which states that when researching religious phenomena, the scientist must refrain from asserting/denying their truth. The second principle, directly related specifically to natural science views in the psychology of religion, is the principle of biological interpretation, according to which the psychology of religion should be:

1. Physiological, and use, where applicable, organic causes in explaining religious phenomena;
2. Genetic, or evolutionary, in its attentiveness to external and internal factors of the development of religiosity;
3. Comparative, which consists in sensitivity to individual differences;
4. Dynamic, recognizing religious life as an extremely complex process involving the action of many factors (Flournoy, 1903).

As we can see, the requirement to use, where applicable, organic causes in explaining religious phenomena directs researchers to identify the biological foundation of religious phenomena of the psyche. It can be quite successfully fulfilled in the field of psychopathology, but at the same time it leaves no room for the researcher to consider the socio-cultural “layer” in the psyche of a religious person. The further historical development of the psychology of religion has shown that the principle of biological interpretation is somewhat one-sided. Modern psychologists of religion do not adhere to it in the form in which it was formulated by T. Flournoy, considering it outdated. At the same time, in the modern psychology of religion, the requirement to identify natural, rather than supernatural, causes of religious phenomena of the psyche is preserved, just as the methodological significance of the principle of the exclusion of transcendence is preserved.

It can be said that the principle of biological interpretation in a concentrated form expressed the naturalistic aspirations of early psychologists of religion. And despite its one-sided reductionism, it proved to be an important step in historical terms towards the formation of natural science views in the psychology of religion.

3.2. Sources of Modern Natural Science Views in the Psychology of Religion: Genetics, Neuroscience, Cognitive Science, Evolutionism

The psychology of religion, having experienced a rapid growth in the 1880s-1920s, significantly waned in the 1930s-1950s, and scientific interest in it substantially decreased. Attempts to revive this interest in the 1960s, undertaken by some European psychologists, were not crowned with significant success. Only in the 1990s did the psychology of religion begin to experience an era of revival, when new approaches and research directions appeared, academic associations of psychologists of religion (“International Association for the Psychology of Religion,” “Division 36. Psychology of Religion” of the American Psychological Association, etc.), and new specialized scientific journals.

Natural science ideas in the psychology of religion, after a certain period of lull, again began to be heard from psychologists of religion. These ideas clearly manifested themselves in the 1990s-2000s in connection with achievements and developments in the field of: 1 – genetics; 2 – neuroscience (behavioral neuroscience, neuropsychology); 3 – cognitive and evolutionary approaches (in religious studies, anthropology, psychology).

3.2.1. Genetics

The understanding of the biological foundations of religious phenomena of the mind was largely influenced by R. Dawkins’ theory of evolutionary gene selection. This theory supplemented the conception of natural selection at the level of populations and individual organisms with the doctrine of natural selection at the level of individual genes. R. Dawkins believes that genes struggle for existence in the process of natural selection, using organisms as carriers and transmitters. “Selfish” genes (in R. Dawkins’ terminology) strive for the greatest possible number of replications, increasing the degree of adaptation, as well as the probability of their survival and transition to organisms of the next generation (Dawkins, 2015a, 2015b). By analogy with genes as carriers of biological information, R. Dawkins also introduced the concept of memes – replicator units carrying an array of encoded cultural information, psychologically “pleasant” for people and spread through imitation, learning (Dawkins, 2015a, 2015b). The development of genetics made it possible to raise the question of the hereditary conditionality of such phenomena as language, altruism, spirituality, morality, etc., previously considered exclusively culturally transmitted. Thus, for example, S. Pinker (2004), who defends the idea of the existence of a language gene, noted that a person learns language in about the same sense in which a spider learns to weave a web. In the work of D. Hamer, it is shown that “spirituality” may well be fixed psychometrically, and the tendency underlying spirituality is heritable (Hamer, 2005). The researcher managed to experimentally identify the so-called “spirituality gene” VMAT2 – it is to this that most of the heritability (28% of changes in alleles – a marker of “spirituality”) is attributed. Nevertheless, Hamer himself does not absolutize the genetic factor alone, believing that the responsibility for whether this gene “fires” in a particular organism lies with other factors, including cultural conditions. In the works of other researchers, it was also found that the polymorphism of the dopamine receptor gene, DRD4, is significantly associated with measurements of spirituality and “self-transcendence” on the scale of personality characteristics (Comings et al., 2000).

Despite the successes of genetics in studying the hereditary mechanisms of transmission of so-called “cultural” phenomena, it certainly should not be assumed that genetic predisposition to certain cultural forms is predetermination. Here one can agree with representatives of the systemic-evolutionary approach to the psyche, Yu. I. Aleksandrov and N. L. Aleksandrova, that both in humans and animals there exists a biological predisposition to the assimilation of culture, to the mastery of corresponding species-typical skills (Aleksandrov, Aleksandrova, 2009). In other words, genes determine epigenetic rules that channel the development and assimilation of culture (Wilson, 1999). Thus, modern ideas about the biological heritability of culture presuppose only a certain species “cultural specialization.”

3.2.2. Neuroscience and Neurotheology

The development of neuroscience both theoretically and methodologically (the advent of positron emission tomography (PET), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and single-photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) coupled with the possibilities of neuroimaging) has significantly advanced psychologists in understanding the neural mechanisms of religiosity.

With these studies, the emergence of such a scientific field as neurotheology is connected. We will discuss the problem of its contribution to the development of natural science views in the psychology of religion below.

Neurotheology is a scientific direction that took shape in the studies of a number of authors (Alper, 2014; Newberg, D’Aquili, Rause, 2013; Ashbrook, 1984; Ashbrook, Albright, 1999; Newberg, D’Aquili, 2001, etc.), which is focused on studying the neural mechanisms that ensure the realization (acquisition, reproduction, transmission, etc.) of religious experience. E. Newberg, E. D’Aquili, and V. Rause noted that the main theses of neurotheology can be formulated as follows:

1. Religious phenomena of the psyche are marked by changes in brain activity that are subject to investigation.
2. This is not proof/refutation of the existence of God.
3. Is religious experience “localized” in the brain functionally or morphologically?
4. Does a special “spiritual” function exist?

Neurotheology attempts to discover patterns that are universal and independent of cultural matrices. Group rituals, as well as individual religiosity, contribute to the involvement of the same emotional discharges related to the emotions of fear, peace, or ecstasy. These emotions and this experience can be induced by deafferentation, i.e., limiting the access of information to brain structures (Newberg, D’Aquili, Rause, 2013).

Analyzing the above-listed theses of neurotheology, it seems to us that only one of them (and the most secular one at that!) can be recognized as innovative – this is the question of the existence/non-existence of a special “spiritual” function from the point of view of the brain mechanisms of the psyche. The remaining theses are by no means new, because changes in brain activity during any mental phenomena (including those related to religious experience) were recorded long before the advent of neurotheology. Also not new is the second thesis, rather reproducing T. Flournoy’s principle of the exclusion of transcendence as applied to the subject field of neuroscience; although this thesis itself is methodologically correct. And finally, the third thesis is a concretization of one of the main problems of neuropsychology – the problem of localizationism or anti-localizationism of mental functions in the brain.

At first glance, it might seem that neurotheology is a perfectly academic field of neuroscience, having a clear natural science methodological base. However, this is not quite so. As T. V. Malevich rightly notes, neurotheology uses “diametrically opposite methods and approaches: from elucidating the neurobiological determination of religious behavior to neuroradiological and neurochemical studies aimed at identifying the correlation between religious experiences and the structural-functional organization of the brain; from attempts to use neuroscience to substantiate theology and the value of religious experiences to ‘methodological agnosticism’ and ‘methodological naturalism'” (Malevich, 2013, p. 63). Neurotheology actually shares a rather crude, in methodological terms, position of radical localizationism, trying to find a unique neurobiological substrate for elements of religious experience like the “God zone” or “spirituality zone.” This is akin to trying to find in the brain a zone for “perception of furry things,” a zone for “perception of a car,” which is quite meaningless (Ratcliffe, 2006). At the same time, neurotheologists consider religious experience not as a special case of a person’s everyday experience, but as something extremely unique and specific, which should have, in their view, a special unique neurobiological basis in the human organism. Therefore, representatives of this direction are mainly focused on the study of special mystical and ecstatic states, eccentric manifestations of religiosity. This radically distinguishes their approach from the cognitive approach, which attempts to reveal the regularities of religious thinking, behavior, and experience as particular manifestations of more general regularities of the functioning of human cognitive processes (Day, 2009).

One should not forget about the general critique of such localizationism from the standpoint of parallel information processing and the theory of systemic and dynamic localization of higher mental functions, developed by A. R. Luria and his students. Their works showed that the brain support of higher mental functions (which are also involved in the constitution of a person’s religious experience) requires the work of the brain as a whole: “…higher mental functions as complex functional systems cannot be localized in narrow zones of the cerebral cortex or in isolated cell groups, but must encompass complex systems of jointly working zones, each of which contributes to the realization of complex mental processes and which can be located in completely different, sometimes far distant from each other, areas of the brain” (Luria, 2013, p. 77).

Furthermore, neurotheology does not offer explanations of religious experience as systemically determined. In its search for unique neurobiological causes of religious experiences and mystical states, it ignores such levels of determination as the social and the psychological proper. At the same time, neurotheology commits a methodological error, mistaking correlations between neurobiological variables and religious experiences for cause-and-effect relationships.

In view of these considerations, we cannot but agree that, “despite the reliance of neurotheology on natural-scientific methodology, many of its assertions are hypothetical and speculative in nature” (Malevich, 2013, p. 79).

Among the studies of religious experience in the field of neuroscience, we cannot fail to mention those which, unlike neurotheological ones, are carried out on a more traditional neurophysiological and neuropsychological methodology. There are studies showing that religiosity is associated with the functioning of the temporal lobes of the brain and intensifies in temporal lobe epilepsy (Persinger, 1984, 1991, 1993; Ogata, Miyakawa, 1998). However, as S. Schachter points out, such an assertion must be made very cautiously, as medical data on this matter are still insufficiently complete (Schachter, 2006). P. McNamara (McNamara, 2001, 2002), as well as P. McNamara, J. Andresen, and J. Gellard (McNamara, Andresen, Gellard, 2003), provided a number of experimental and clinical data showing that the frontal lobes are involved in some religious and ritual practices. Without going into details, we note that at present quite a lot of experimental data have been accumulated indicating that the dopaminergic systems of the prefrontal cortex influence religiosity: disorders associated with increased dopaminergic activity, such as schizophrenia and obsessive-compulsive disorder, are often accompanied by increased religiosity. Changes in prefrontal activity may be accompanied by changes in religious behavior.

It is also important to note the discussion crucial for the development of natural science views in the psychology of religion between proponents of the “limbic marker” hypothesis and the “cognitive imperative” hypothesis. According to N. P. Azari and M. Slors, the “limbic marker” hypothesis contributed to attempts to explain the natural origin of religion based on brain activity data obtained during the study of religious experiences, i.e., mental states that are non-cognitive in their essence. The non-cognitive nature of these experiences makes it possible to describe them outside of any religious tradition, i.e., outside the system of specific beliefs (Azari, Slors, 2007).

The general idea of this hypothesis is that if it could be shown that religious experiences are based on evolutionarily “primitive” neural circuits (i.e., including “low-level” brain structures that humans share with less evolutionarily developed species of living beings), then it could be argued that religion also has primitive evolutionary roots and that it arose as an element of the development of nature.

However, the “limbic marker” hypothesis encounters conceptual difficulties. Interpreting certain non-cognitive mental states as experiences specifically of the supernatural is possible only within an already existing religious tradition, i.e., in the context of a certain cognitive system of beliefs in the supernatural. But then it turns out that outside the religious tradition, these states can be interpreted as experiences of anything and not necessarily of supernatural reality (Azari, Slors, 2007). The paradox is how, in that case, they can lead to the emergence of cognitive elements – religious beliefs?

In contrast to the “limbic marker” hypothesis, E. Newberg and E. D’Aquili believe that the emergence of beliefs can be explained by the peculiarities of the organization of the human psyche: the “cognitive imperative” – a biologically determined need for cognition of reality; the ability to foresee events and fear them (for example, to experience fear of one’s own death); the “causal operator” – the tendency to find causes for various events; the “binary operator” – the tendency to interpret reality in a system of opposite categories (e.g., “light” and “darkness,” “heaven” and “hell”) (Newberg, d’Aquili, 2001). However, these arguments, according to N. P. Azari and M. Slors, do not explain the generally illogical nature of many myths and beliefs, nor do they explain the facts of their obvious correspondence to the features of the social organization of the community that creates them (Azari, Slors, 2007).

Without going into the details of this discussion, we note that so far neuroimaging studies of religious experiences do not confirm the “limbic marker” hypothesis, and the idea of the “cognitive imperative” still needs additional substantiation and verification.

The development of natural science views in the psychology of religion was also facilitated by the application of neuroeconomic theories to the study of religious experience.

Neuroeconomics is a scientific discipline that applies economic models to study the work of the brain and uses neurobiological data in the field of economic theory. The work of the brain (brain processes) is analyzed using special concepts: “risks,” “costs,” “rewards,” “free rider,” “costly-to-fake signals,” etc. The Costly Signaling Theory has gained great popularity in neuroeconomics. The application of costly signaling theory to evolutionary models of religion offers a plausible mechanism for explaining how religion facilitates cooperative interaction (Sosis, 2003; Sosis, Alcorta, 2003). Costly signals are such patterns of behavior that impose certain costs on the individual demonstrating them – “expenses” that go beyond the basic “expenses” that any behavioral acts entail, and therefore are difficult to fake by individuals unable to bear the corresponding “expenses” (Sosis, Alcorta, 2003). Proponents of costly signaling theory argue that the patterns of religious behavior that demonstrate the degree of an individual’s commitment to a group are “costly-to-fake signals.” In other words, from an economic point of view, it is unprofitable (“costly”) for a person to imitate their religiosity in front of others for the sake of obtaining any public goods. Proponents of this theory believe that religion’s ability to promote cooperation is its main adaptive function (Irons, 1996; Irons, 2001; Sosis, 2003).

Undoubtedly, the neuroeconomic approach has the right to exist in the psychology of religion and will probably still prove productive in solving certain problems of this branch. Nevertheless, at present it is not possible to assess the boundaries of this approach, the measure of its applicability to religious phenomena of the psyche. Without this, one can easily fall into the trap of unjustified reductionism or pseudo-scientific speculation with economic terminology.

3.2.3. Cognitive and Evolutionary Approaches

The cognitive and evolutionary approaches, actively developing at present in disciplines such as religious studies, anthropology, and psychology, have become another source of development for natural science views in the psychology of religion. The metaphor of the psyche as a cognitive apparatus that processes information and has a limited processing capacity proved to be quite applicable to the study of religious phenomena. The experimental possibilities provided by modern cognitive science (the possibility of formulating operational hypotheses, their controlled testing, etc.), the theory of modularity of brain/mind functioning, ideas of bio-cultural co-evolution, etc., were received by the psychology of religion and a number of other scientific fields. This led to the formation of such overlapping scientific directions as cognitive and evolutionary psychology of religion, cognitive and evolutionary religious studies, cognitive and evolutionary anthropology.

In the context of natural science conceptions, one of the fundamental questions of modern psychology of religion is the following: is religion an evolutionarily useful mechanism that promotes adaptation, or is it a by-product of evolution, representing an exaptation (the application of an adaptation for purposes not related to the original ones)?

At present, the discussion on this topic is far from over and is only intensifying. L. A. Kirkpatrick believes that debates about the supposed adaptive function will undoubtedly continue in the future psychology of religion, but they will be more productive in the context of a general paradigm that recognizes and substantiates the importance of the evolved psychological architecture for explaining behavior (Kirkpatrick, 1999).

From the point of view of proponents of understanding religion as an evolutionarily useful mechanism, religion promotes human prosocial behavior – compliance with social norms, cultural patterns of behavior. Religion is a powerful means of regulating social behavior. Ultimately, the prosociality provided by religion enhances fitness and reproductive success. Overall, religion promotes cooperation, altruism, and group cohesion, which significantly increases its chances of survival. This position is defended by A. Norenzayan and A. F. Shariff (Norenzayan, Shariff, 2008), proponents of the neuroeconomic theory of costly signals (Irons, 1996; Irons, 2001; Sosis, 2003), and others.

Other scientists believe that religion is a by-product of evolution (Atran, 2002; Boyer, 2000, 2001, 2003; Boyer, Ramble, 2001; Boyer, Bergstrom, 2008; Kirkpatrick, 1999, 2006, 2011; Pinker, 2006). If religion were an adaptive function hard-wired into the brain, then the presence in humans of a religious “instinct” generating religion for the purpose of adaptation would be evident. At the same time, as L. A. Kirkpatrick suggests, assumptions about what the adaptive function of such religious instincts consists of form a long list and do not seem plausible: ranging from protection against the fear of death or other forms of consolation to group advantages, such as ensuring cohesion, solidarity, and reducing conflict (Kirkpatrick, 1999).

The position substantiated by L. A. Kirkpatrick (Kirkpatrick, 1999, 2005), as well as S. Atran (Atran, 2002), is that the set of heterogeneous phenomena denoted by the term “religion” is a set of by-products of several adaptive mechanisms that have their own, pragmatic life functions. In other words, we have no special instinct for playing football, yet we create a game that aligns with many psychological mechanisms unrelated to football.

If we speak about religion, belief in the existence of supernatural forces and beings apparently arises as a by-product of systems that emerged in the course of evolution, whose task is to understand the physical, biological, and interpersonal environment (Boyer, 2001).

Cognitive and evolutionary psychologists of religion consider the brain as an apparatus formed in the course of evolution (hard-wired), which is narrowly specialized (domain-specific) and ensures the individual’s adaptation to living conditions that is optimal for survival and reproductive function. The narrowly specialized functional subsystems of the brain are the same in representatives of different ethnic groups and cultures and are automatically triggered, processing information of a certain type for which they are intended. The idea of innate and pre-tuned narrowly specialized mental mechanisms (so-called “modules,” “functional organs,” etc.) belongs not to cognitive and evolutionary psychologists of religion themselves, but to the famous philosopher of mind J. Fodor (Fodor, 1983). Metaphorically, the modular organization of the mind can be likened to a “Swiss army knife,” each tool of which is predisposed for application to a specific material. It must be said that J. Fodor recognized the modular organization for low-level mental mechanisms (Fodor, 1983). Modern cognitive and evolutionary psychologists of religion adhere to the theory of massive modularity, according to which the entire mind as a whole is subject to modular organization.

In 1993, in his monograph “Faces in the Clouds,” S. Guthrie expressed the idea that belief in supernatural agents is based on cognitive biases inherent in our psyche (Guthrie, 1993). Subsequently, this idea was developed into the conception of the existence of a special mental “module” – the “Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device” (HADD). Similar to the face recognition module existing in humans, HADD allows us to realize a narrowly specialized and evolutionarily useful function. HADD works as follows: in any situation where an organism receives an unknown signal, this module instantly interprets it as emanating from some living agent and potentially dangerous. For example, a rustle in the bushes when you are in the forest instantly evokes a hypothesis about the presence of an outsider, a potentially dangerous living agent, such as a predator. And despite the fact that in reality the rustle may be caused by a dry branch falling from a tree, for the organism it is evolutionarily more useful to react to an unknown stimulus as threatening and potentially dangerous: it is better to react once more to a rustle as to a predator and stay alive than to react neutrally and be eaten by a tiger.

Based on the HADD idea, J. Barrett conducted experimental studies showing that this module is hypersensitive and can easily be triggered in situations where real agents are absent, generating ideas about anthropomorphic living beings (Barrett, 1996; Barrett, Keil, 1996).

Among the natural science views, some of which we are forced to leave beyond the scope of our article, P. Boyer’s theory of cognitive optimum deserves attention (Boyer, 2000). According to P. Boyer, religious ideas arise as minor cognitive violations of non-religious concepts. Our non-religious concepts are classified into specific categories. The researcher identifies 5 fundamental categories: natural object, artifact, plant, animal, person. Any non-religious concept possesses a so-called intuitive ontology – implicit properties that we intuitively attribute to this concept, for example, the concept “table” has intuitive properties: has a surface, is an artifact, is made of solid material (wood, metal, glass, etc.), etc. These intuitive properties are determined by our folk physics. In relation to living beings, expectations from the field of folk biology and psychology come into play. Concepts of supernatural beings violate our intuitive conceptions in the field of biology or psychology, due to which they gain an advantage in being culturally stable, well-remembered, and transmitted in culture. For example, folk biology tells us that every living being is mortal. However, the existence of a living but immortal supernatural being violates our intuitive expectations and possesses a counter-intuitive property. Nevertheless, to be perceived and culturally transmitted, religious concepts must possess a certain set of intuitive properties. Therefore, as a rule, despite the fact that deities are thought of as existing outside space and time, omnipotent, etc., they are attributed properties intuitively understandable for living beings – to have intentions, think, love, hate, make mistakes, etc. (Boyer, 2001).

Thus, for a deity to have “cultural success,” it must possess intuitive and some counter-intuitive properties. At the same time, the number of counter-intuitive properties should not exceed a certain cognitive optimum. For example, a cat possessing 2 counter-intuitive properties – the ability to fly and read people’s minds – will have greater “cultural success” than a cat capable of flying, reading minds, having 94 paws, made of stone, and living in a parallel world. Overall, as P. Boyer writes, religious concepts are acquired and used not because they are good for people or society as a whole, and not as a result of an internal need or desire to possess them. They are acquired and used because they are easier to remember and much simpler to master than all others (Boyer, 2000).

Discussion

Summarizing the above, it can be concluded that the development of natural science views in the psychology of religion was non-linear and discrete.

Their genesis at the end of the 19th – beginning of the 20th century was connected not with methodological innovations in psychology – the introduction of the experimental method into laboratory research – but with a distinct desire of psychologists to find naturalistic explanations for religious phenomena of the mind. The search for these explanations led scientists at the initial stage of the development of the psychology of religion to biological interpretations of religious phenomena. Religious experience was, in essence, derived from the organic features of man and his biological connections with the environment. Certainly, these early attempts suffered from mechanism and excessive reductionism, which led to biologizing ontologically complex religious phenomena, leveling their socio-cultural specificity.

Due to the lack of data in the field of genetics at the early stage of the development of psychological science, the impossibility of conducting serious neurological studies of religiosity because of the imperfection of methodological tools, and the objective difficulties of applying experiment in the field of studying religious experience did not lead to significant progress in the development of verifiable natural science theories in the psychology of religion.

However, in historical terms, early naturalistic explanations of religious phenomena of the psyche contributed to the formation of the psychology of religion as a scientific discipline as a whole. They strengthened the conception of religion as a product of natural life processes, which may well be an object of scientific research. The naturalistic aspirations of psychologists of the late 19th – early 20th century helped to reflect on the methodological principles of the psychology of religion, which had a beneficial effect on its further development. We believe that a significant contribution to the emergence of natural science views in that period was made not by behaviorists, who conducted few special behavioral experiments with believers, but by physicians – psychiatrists and psychopathologists. It was in the works of physicians, attentive to physiology and other bodily manifestations, that religious phenomena of the psyche, with all their persuasiveness, appeared as symptoms of natural origin.

After a significant historical hiatus, in the 1990s-2000s, researchers’ interest in the natural determinants of religiosity revived. This interest is fed from several sources: genetics, neuroscience, cognitive science, and evolutionism. There is a certain return to the search for a biological (genetic, neurobiological) substrate of religious experience, already taking into account the methodological and technical possibilities of modern genetics and neuroscience. The experimental data obtained in specific studies are still quite limited and contradictory for making generalized conclusions. Some conclusions, for example, about the presence in the brain of a “God zone” and the like, which can sometimes be heard from representatives of such a field as neurotheology, are highly speculative. However, it can be stated that well-founded hypotheses about the biological prerequisites of religious phenomena of the psyche have matured in the psychology of religion (hypotheses of the temporal lobes, “limbic marker”, “cognitive imperative”, etc.).

At the same time, the experience of natural science research in the psychology of religion shows that finding explanations for religious phenomena of the psyche based solely on neuroscience data, without recourse to socio-cultural, historical, and anthropological materials, is not possible.

Cognitive and evolutionary approaches to religious experience, in our opinion, have significantly advanced the psychology of religion along the path of natural science development. Experiments showing the counter-intuitiveness of religious representations and their limitation by the features of the cognitive “apparatus” of the mind (in particular, cognitive biases) have allowed the advancement of a well-founded hypothesis about the cognitive origin of religion. The specificity of religious representations, consisting in the fact that they violate our intuitive (naive) expectations regarding objects of nature, culture, and other people, as cognitivists believe, ensures the success of their cultural transmission.

Discussions around the question of whether to consider religious phenomena of the mind as an evolutionarily useful adaptive mechanism or a certain by-product of evolution are currently far from completion – the empirical data obtained on this matter are still contradictory. However, for the development of natural science views in the psychology of religion, this discussion is extremely useful, since it raises with all directness and clarity the question of the functional purpose of religious beliefs, experiences, and behavioral models.

A weak point of cognitive and evolutionary studies of religious phenomena of the psyche, as we believe, is their ahistorical character – in fact, the primitive beliefs of a savage and those of a modern educated European are placed on the same level. With such a view, which is certainly productive for certain purposes, the role of social factors, the specificity of the cultural dimension of religious phenomena is not highlighted. The consequence of this is excessive reductionism, with which far from all psychologists of religion are ready to agree. The concept of modular organization of the psyche, which has received wide application for cognitive and evolutionary explanations of religiosity, also attracts critical remarks. In this regard, the systemic-functional approach to the organization of the psyche, which could serve as a good alternative to the theory of massive modularity in the field of the psychology of religion, remains underestimated.

Evaluating the ideas and prospects of the evolutionary approach, we are far from L. A. Kirkpatrick’s thought that evolutionary psychology of religion should become not just a direction of the psychology of religion, alongside others, but a basic paradigm for the entire branch (Kirkpatrick, 2011). As it seems to us, the evolutionary approach has important limitations. Firstly, representatives of the evolutionary approach do not significantly distinguish cultural-historical factors of mental development from biological ones. In this case, the reduction of the entire diversity of humanity’s cultural life to evolutionary mechanisms seems an unjustified simplification. Studying man as a representative of the species of living beings, alongside others, is possible and necessary, but ignoring the specificity of cultural existence as a source of development of the human psyche is methodologically not entirely correct and hardly productive.

It is precisely thanks to culture that human existence radically differs from the existence of the animal world, being subject not so much to the biological laws of evolution as to the laws of historical development (following the thought of K. Marx). The culture of humanity has its own ontological status, therefore any direct reduction of higher cultural manifestations to biological ones, developed by evolution, seems unjustified. For example, explaining the long-term spiritual quests of a particular person, culminating in religious conversion, by the modular organization of the psyche, without considering the many mediating socio-cultural links and determinants, means making an incorrect “leap” between different levels of explanation of phenomena. In this regard, the ideas of the cultural-historical theory of L. S. Vygotsky (2000) look promising in research terms, which could become the basis for an approach alternative to the evolutionary one in the psychology of religion. The idea of considering religion as a system of artificial stimuli-means – psychological tools – created by man in the process of cultural-historical development for mastering one’s own psyche and behavior looks highly heuristic.

Secondly, the concept of modularity of the psyche, shared by cognitive and evolutionary psychologists of religion, is only a theoretical hypothesis and far from the only one in cognitive psychology – it is enough to recall the connectionist (neural network) and symbolic approaches.

The modular approach to the psyche is often criticized. Thus, for example, the author of the idea of “universal grammar,” N. Chomsky (1972), believed that the development of the language system in functional terms does not depend on the development of other mental structures, but represents an autonomous module of the mind. The presence of this universal, and therefore culturally non-specific, module can explain, according to the author, the amazing similarity of grammatical structures of languages of different peoples of the world. However, J. Bruner, based on a study of the logic and nature of mother-child interaction in communications and joint games, concludes: “Apparently, it can be argued that the child learns the grammatical rules necessary for constructing and understanding sentences through their correspondence to the conceptual structure created to regulate joint action and joint attention. This would be equivalent to asserting that grammar arises as a set of rules extracted from jointly regulated activity that has become codified in the culture of the linguistic community” (Bruner, 1984, p. 45). In other words, the grammar of language correlates with the “grammar” of behavior. This, presumably, is the reason for the existence of grammatical universals common to most languages, and not a narrowly specialized language module of the mind.

One can also assess the validity of the critique of the modular approach using the example of the idea (developed by M. Hauser within the framework of the intuitive concept of morality) that a person possesses a species-specific “moral organ,” which is a neural network specially designed for operating with moral problems (Hauser, 2008). It is thanks to this module, according to the author, that a person makes an intuitive moral choice, which is then rationally justified. The critique of this approach, carried out from the standpoint of the theory of functional systems by Yu. I. Aleksandrov, in our view, is quite fair. Yu. I. Aleksandrov argues that genes are connected with moral behavior not directly, but through the process of neuron specialization, which literally means that “certain neurons ‘learn’ by their activity to ensure the behavior formed by the individual: working with a computer program, casting a fishing rod, sawing wood, dancing a certain dance, counting mentally, etc.” (Aleksandrov, 2008, p. 12). At the same time, the formation of the described skills (the process of systemogenesis) involves the entire brain, not some “organ” with its specific function.

Thus, the so-called “HADD module,” about which cognitive and evolutionary psychologists of religion write, may turn out to be not so much a module as a functional system that has passed lifetime systemogenesis – a developed skill of neurons in the process of the organism’s holistic interaction with the environment to respond in a certain way to unidentified stimuli and signals.

Finally, in general, the evolutionary paradigm, with a clear awareness of the boundaries of its applicability, can lead to the productive development of a number of problematic areas of the psychology of religion, such as genetic and neural mechanisms of religiosity, “low-level” mental processes involved in religious experience, etc. At the same time, proponents of the evolutionary approach should not narrow themselves to the concept of modularity of the psyche, but consider the possibilities of other approaches, for example, the systemic-functional one.

Conclusions

The development of natural science views in the psychology of religion has been non-linear and discrete. Their genesis at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century was driven not by the experimental method, but by a desire for naturalistic explanations, leading to early biological interpretations that, while reductive, were crucial for establishing religion as a legitimate object of scientific study. The significant contribution of this period came from psychiatry, which demonstrated the natural origins of religious symptoms.

After a long hiatus, interest revived in the 1990s, fueled by advances in genetics, neuroscience, and cognitive and evolutionary science. Modern research has generated well-founded hypotheses about the biological and cognitive prerequisites of religiosity, moving beyond simplistic localizationism. The cognitive and evolutionary approaches, in particular, have provided powerful models, such as HADD and cognitive optimality theory, explaining religion as a likely by-product of evolved cognitive mechanisms.

The prospects for the development of natural science views in the psychology of religion are quite broad. The experimental method in laboratory studies of religious experience is only just beginning to gain its popularity. Testing existing hypotheses and advancing new ones about the cognitive and non-cognitive determinants of religious beliefs, resolving the question of the evolutionary meaning of religious phenomena of the mind or its absence – all this is a matter of the future of this scientific branch. In turn, we hope for the psychology of religion to overcome rigid reductionist schemes along this path and to reveal the role of cultural-historical factors in the development and functioning of religious phenomena of the mind.

CRediT author statement:

The author is solely responsible for submitting the final version of the manuscript for publication. The final version of the manuscript was approved by the author.

Conflict of interest. The author declares no conflicts of interest.

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